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Experience in Indian Religions 
Experience is, in one way or another, an important feature of all religions. Though there are a 
wide range of focuses and understandings of what is being experienced, and though the degree 
of intensity and the expected present or future effect of a believer’s experience varies profoundly 
both between individuals and between religious traditions, there would be few members of any 
faith who would not agree that ‘religious experience’ is an integral part of their religion as a 
whole. 
 
Indian religions, if I may continue in very general terms a little longer, differ from Western 
religions in that salvation itself, the goal of the path, is described in terms of a liberating 
experience. Typically, this is stated to be experientially knowing (the existential nature of the 
experience is sometimes just called knowledge or knowing) the true nature of Reality. And also 
typically, Reality is explained in terms of the nature of the self and the nature of everything else. 
Thus one might say that in these religions what one is aiming to experience is one’s self and its 
ontological context. Within this tradition, Buddhism has been said to differ from other Indian 
religions only in the sense that the Buddha taught that liberation was achieved not by 
experiencing one’s true self but by experiencing that in Reality all things are not self, anatta.  
 
 
The Difference in Early Buddhist Teaching 
For Indian religions, then, including Buddhism which is the specific subject of my paper, 
experience is a sine qua non.
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 What I would like to do in this paper is to suggest that what makes 
the early Buddhist teachings different from those of other Indian religions is not that they are 
saying that it is a differently structured truth about Reality that one should be aiming to experi-
ence, but that what they are saying is that one should be aiming to know the truth about the 
reality of experience itself.  In my view, the doctrine of anatta (not self) in early Buddhism, can 
act – and indeed has acted – as a red herring if it is taken as the central teaching of Buddhism and 
interpreted in the way in which it usually is. What I would like to suggest is, first, that one should 
understand it slightly differently, and accord it a different emphasis; and, second, that the truly 
central point about what the Buddha taught is that one should understand experience qua 
experience. 
 
I have already begun making these suggestions in recently published work,
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 and this paper itself 
is part of on-going work in progress.
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 So far, I have contextualised my challenge to the common 
interpretation of anatta by discussing it in the light of an examination of what is meant by the 
khandhas, the related teaching that is usually explained as stating that human beings are 
comprised of five constituent parts called khandhas. These five are the living body, feelings, 
apperceptions, volitions and consciousness.
4
  So that I can more readily draw out my suggestion 
about the centrality of experience per se, I shall first rehearse the essential aspects of how I think 
we should understand both anatta and the khandhas.  
THE CENTRALITY OF EXPERIENCE IN THE 
TEACHINGS OF EARLY BUDDHISM 
 2 
Understanding Anatta and the Khandhas 
The reason I first embarked on this work was that I had previously found (and I am sure I was not 
alone in this) the doctrine of anatta most difficult and seemingly also inconsistent in the context 
of the other teachings. Its meaning is not actually explained in the texts themselves and it is open 
to different interpretations. Until quite recently this doctrine was understood to be saying that 
liberation (called nirvana
5
 in Buddhism) from the cycle of rebirth is achieved by, or involves, the 
extinguishing of your self. The word nirvana means ‘blowing out’, and it was thought that it 
referred to the blowing out of the self. In fact this interpretation, which represents the view of 
people called annihilationists (the self is annihilated at liberation), is strongly denied in the early 
Buddhist texts and was clearly wrong. 
 
But though Buddhists and scholars alike then successfully refuted this earlier erroneous 
interpretation of anatta,
6
 pointing out that what nirvana refers to is the blowing out not of one’s 
self but of what fuels one’s continuity, I found the ‘corrected’ interpretation if anything 
conceptually more difficult to grasp and actually less in harmony with other Buddhist teachings 
than the earlier interpretation. The corrected interpretation
7
 of the doctrine states that what you 
need to understand is that you are not, and nor do you have, and nor have you ever been or had, 
an abiding self. 
 
This interpretation draws out the contrast with other prominent religious ideas being taught at 
the time of early Buddhism, notably those of the early Upanisads, which stated that in fact the 
essence of a human being, one’s real Self, is identical with the immortal and unchanging essence 
of the universe. This is usually expressed by the well-known formula atman is Brahman. Atman is 
the Sanskrit form of the Pali word atta, meaning self, and Brahman refers to the universal 
Absolute. A famous Upanisadic way of putting this is ‘you are [all] that’ (tat tvam asi).
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 So the 
Upanisadic teaching, given within what is called the Brahmanical religion of India, was that if one 
realised, in the sense of existentially experiencing, this micro– and macro-cosmic identity, then 
one achieved liberation (called moksa by the brahmins) from the cycle of lives on earth in which 
all human beings otherwise continue. The Buddhist teaching was similarly experiential, but, it 
was suggested, it was the experience not of what your self is, but that you do not have one: 
ultimately, you are not. 
 
This interpretation is taken in tandem with the teaching that one should understand oneself in 
terms of the five components called khandhas. The link between anatta and the khandhas is 
made through an analogy found in the texts which states: “When all constituent parts are there, 
the word ‘cart’ is used; just so, where there are five khandhas, there is the convention of a ‘living 
being’.”
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 This suggests that we are made up of five separate parts which, when together, 
constitute our functioning self; but there is (and never has been and never will be) in fact no 
abiding self other than that temporary combination. 
 
It is as thus understood that I found the doctrine of anatta at best seriously problematic and at 
worst incoherent in the context of the way other key Buddhist teachings are collectively 
characterised. Even a relatively casual acquaintance with them, especially if one looks at how 
they are given in the texts and not in secondary sources, impresses on one that their focus is 
primarily not just on personal continuity but on personal responsibility: understanding that 
through the knock-on effect(s) of one’s desires and volitions, one has created one’s own present 
and will create one’s own future (and can therefore change it); that it is because those desires 
and volitions originate in a matrix of ignorance that we keep having them and thus keep fuelling 
our continuity (this is the fuel that needs to be blown out); that it is the qualitative state of one’s 
own mind that determines the qualitative context of one’s rebirths; and above all the teachings 
are about knowing how and why one is continuing as one is, and about knowing that one can, 
and how one can and eventually does, attain liberation. 
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There is a strong emphasis on knowing: the aim of the teachings is not a catatonic trancelike 
state; on the contrary, it is the positive insight that comes with the total cessation of ignorance. 
This, indeed, is what the term buddha, which means awakened or enlightened, refers to, and one 
has only to read the accounts of the Buddha’s enlightenment to realise the profundity of what is 
meant by it.
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 How might this combination of understanding one’s continuity, accepting personal 
responsibility, attending to one’s state of mind, and progressing from ignorance to knowledge 
accommodate a goal of experiencing that one has no self?  
 
 
The Structure of the Teachings 
Several scholarly studies have drawn together extensive textual evidence suggesting that early 
Buddhist texts do in fact allow for a conventional everyday self.
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 But they did not satisfactorily 
explain what to me was the fundamental problem: how can one experience that one is or has no 
self, that one is not? With the best will in the world, I could not but think that in any context 
outside of a madhouse the very idea of it is incoherent. In offering alternative interpretations, 
some scholars went so far as to suggest that the point of the anatta teaching was that one should 
not confuse any conventional notion of self with one’s eternal and real transcendental self.
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 But 
eternalists are coupled with annihilationists in the texts and get equally short shrift. I felt one 
needed to try another approach. 
 
In looking at the way most of the main doctrinal teachings found in the Pali Nikayas are given, I 
found that they had a common structure. And I suggested that interpreting the anatta doctrine in 
the same way not only overcame the problem with that doctrine but in fact showed that it fitted 
together with the other teachings very well. The common structure of all of the teachings is that 
they are concerned with how something works: none of them is concerned with what something 
is, or, indeed, with what it is not. Most crucially, they are focused on how all the factors of 
human experience in the cycle of lives are dependent on other factors (the most common 
expressions used for this are that everything is dependently originated or conditioned): nothing, 
of whatever nature, exists or occurs independently of conditioning factors. It is important to 
grasp that this is the case both subjectively and objectively, so not only is the state of any 
individual human being (who I take to be a subject) at any given moment dependent on 
conditioning factors, but so are chairs, trees, toenails, musical notes, ideas and thoughts (all of 
which I take to be objective in relation to the subject), and so on. It is the dependent nature of all 
of our actions (karma
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) that explains the mechanics of how one is responsible for one’s own 
experiences and can achieve liberation: in understanding how the process of the cycle of lives 
works one can do something about changing it.  
 
 
The Nature of Self-Hood 
If all things are dependently originated, then it follows that the way human beings occur is not as 
independent selves. As such, any self-hood one may have cannot be permanent and unchanging, 
as independence would be a pre-requisite of such qualities. Accordingly, it is clear that early 
Buddhist teachings are in direct contrast to their contemporary Upanisadic teaching that the 
essence of one’s self is immortal and unchanging: identical with the essence of the universal 
absolute. But in making the clear contrast, the doctrine of anatta is not stating ‘there is no self’. 
Rather, it states that self-hood, being conditioned, is not independent (and therefore not 
immortal and unchanging). And, further, taken together with the other teachings of early 
Buddhism it is stating that in seeking to know what you are, or even whether or not you are, you 
are missing the solution to the problem of cyclic continuity. The solution lies in understanding the 
mechanics of your situation. That you are is neither the question nor in question: you need to 
forget even the issue of self-hood and understand instead how you work in a dependently 
originated world of experience. 
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It is important to grasp the religious context of the time. In common with very many others, the 
Buddha had embarked on a search to understand how to achieve liberation from the cycle of 
lives. This was a problem needing to be solved: none of these people was seeking information 
about the universe for its own sake. Most of these religious seekers, including the brahmins, 
thought that the answer to the problem lay, one way or the other, in knowing what you are, or 
whether you are or are not – hence the above-mentioned references to annihilationists and 
eternalists, amongst others. And hence the typical characterisation of Indian religions I referred 
to at the beginning of this paper. So pervading and persistent was this line of questioning, that 
there are many references in the Sutta Pitaka to the Buddha having denied that this that or the 
other part of what makes up a human being, particularly one of the five khandhas, is actually 
one’s ‘self’.
14 
 
Because of the frequency with which such questions are clearly denied, some may find it difficult 
to leave behind the view that the early Buddhist doctrine of anatta teaches that there is no self, 
and that realising this is the goal of the path to liberation. But in fact the denials are not inconsis-
tent with the alternative interpretation of anatta I have been suggesting. Being dependently 
originated, all the things within the scope of human experience in the cycle of lives, including the 
khandhas, are impermanent and subject to change. As I have said above, it follows that the way 
such things occur is not as independent abiding ‘selves’. Any question asking if any particular 
thing is in fact one’s permanent ‘self’ would, therefore, be denied. But the repeated denials 
should be construed as a response: both to the persistence of the line of questioning, and also to 
the assumption on the part of the questioners that the self they are seeking is independent and 
permanent.
15
 They are not in themselves the focus of the Buddhist teaching in a more positive 
sense.
16
 That focus is, as described above, centred not at all on what one is or is not but on how 
things operate. It is this that is the Buddha’s solution to the problem.  
 
 
The Right Emphasis 
The distinction may be subtle, but it is important: focusing on the notion that anatta means 
‘there is no self’ wrongly emphasises it as a denial of being instead of the way what we think of as 
self-hood occurs. And in sticking out like a conceptual sore thumb, such wrong emphasis draws 
attention away from the harmony of anatta with the all important focus of the rest of the 
teachings. Metaphysics and soteriology are in fact intimately connected in that it is because 
everything is dependently originated that one can, in understanding how the process of 
individual continuity works, then reverse it. My point is supported by passages in the texts. It is 
stated not just that thinking “this is mine, I am this, this is my self” is not helpful,
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 but also that 
when one understands dependent origination one will no longer ask (my emphasis) questions 
such as: “Am I, or am I not? What am I? Why am I? This ‘being’ that is ‘I’, where has it come from, 
where will it go?”
18
 Such passages should not be construed in the sense that thinking ‘this is 
mine’ (and so on) is not helpful because actually there is no such thing. Rather, for the solving of 
the problem of continuity, these are all, quite simply, irrelevant questions. 
 
An analogy will perhaps explain more clearly. I acquire an object that I am told is a computer. The 
storekeeper also tells me that though it will perform a range of functions it is at the moment 
programmed for just one. I realise that it is not the function I want it to perform, so it is 
important that I learn how to change the programme. But I am so fascinated by the whole thing 
that I get side-tracked and keep asking what exactly it is about it that constitutes the fact that it is 
a computer, referring to part after part asking ‘is this bit the computer?’. I also ask what each 
individual part is made of. The storekeeper keeps trying to explain how to change the 
programme, and every time I ask ‘is this bit the computer?’ and what a part is made of, he just 
says ‘not it’s not the computer’, and ‘you need to understand this programming section’. At the 
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end of the day, I have heard from him countless times the expression ‘that bit is not the 
computer’. Given my fascination, I am very puzzled about this, and though I continue to 
speculate as to exactly what the computer is, I also have the very distinct impression from what 
the storekeeper kept saying that there is really no such thing at all. It takes me a while to realise 
that what the computer was not, was not what the storekeeper was trying to tell me. Rather, he 
understood that what I needed to know was how to change the programme and so all he was 
trying to tell me was how the computer worked. It was only my perpetual questions that forced 
him to answer as he did. Furthermore, none of his denials was spoken with the intention of 
informing me that there is no computer at all. Rather, he did not intend to tell me anything 
whatsoever about it in those terms because what the computer is is simply not relevant to me: 
for the solving of my programming problem it is neither the question to ask, nor is its existence in 
question. It may be that there is some part or collection of parts that is the computer in the sense 
that I am seeking, and it may be that there is not: I do not need to know either way, and so the 
storekeeper did not tell me, either directly or indirectly.  
 
 
Understanding of Doctrine 
To a large extent I think this different approach to anatta overcomes the difficulties posed by the 
traditional understanding of the doctrine. So what, then, is meant by the analysis of the human 
being into khandhas, these five constituents of the living body, feelings, apperception, volitions 
and consciousness? According to the texts, the Buddha was consistent in referring to the 
khandhas as the focus of what one should understand about oneself. But other than this, the 
khandhas are as unexplained as anatta; there is very little clear account either of why they are to 
be focused on or of how each or all of them should be understood. What, then, is the suggestion 
that one should think of oneself in terms of five khandhas about? Why would a body of teachings 
concerned with the dependent originatedness of all things describe the human being in terms of 
these five clearly delineated constituents? How does this fit in with the structure of the rest of 
the teachings? And if gaining liberation is neither about knowing what one’s self is or that one 
has no self, then in what way was understanding oneself as being comprised of a temporary 
combination of five khandhas helpful to gaining liberation? 
 
Furthermore, though perhaps less obviously incoherent than the idea of experiencing that one 
has no self, the notion of the khandhas as usually understood is perplexing for the additional 
reason that there is something counter-experiential about the idea that we are so comprised. 
Not only superficially but even on deep reflection I think such an analysis at best simplistic: 
several more meaningful and readily recognisable alternative ways of analysing oneself could be 
arrived at without too much difficulty. So why the khandhas?  
 
 
Why the Khandhas? 
A large part of my book Identity and Experience consists of an attempt to answer this question. 
And what that study showed was that the khandhas are not a comprehensive analysis of what a 
human being is comprised of: that is all we are. Rather, they are the factors of human experience 
(or, better, the experiencing factors) that one needs to understand in order to achieve the goal of 
Buddhist teachings, which is liberation from the cycle of lives. In other words, closer study 
showed that in line with all the other teachings, they are about how the human being operates. 
 
In particular, they are about how human cognition operates. We have all our conscious experi-
ence by means of our cognitive apparatus, and the khandhas are that apparatus. Perhaps the 
most important single indication of this is a passage which states: “Seeing occurs when there is 
contact between an eye and [visible] forms, accompanied by consciousness; this gives rise to 
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feelings, which are then identified; and what is thus identified one reflects on and makes 
manifold.”
19
 Involved in this are the khandhas of the body (rupa), providing both the living locus 
of subjectivity and, more specifically, the sense organs – in this case the eye; feelings (vedana), in 
the sense not of emotions but of the initial feeling of awareness of seeing; apperception (sañña), 
in the sense of being the process of identifying what that initial feeling of awareness is; and 
consciousness (viññana), the fact that the process is one of knowing that one is (in this example) 
seeing something. The identifying process, which operates on the huge mass of incoming experi-
ential data, collectively and generically referred to as dhamma, makes sense of that data; it 
organises it so that it can then be the subject of more sophisticated mental processes such as 
thinking and reflecting about it and clarifying it to however refined a degree our intelligence 
permits and that is appropriate to the subject matter of the data. 
 
So the answer to the question ‘why the khandhas?’ is that it is not the khandhas qua constituent 
parts that is relevant, but that what the word is referring to is the process by which one is having 
one’s experience. And it is this process that one needs to understand, because understanding it is 
the key to knowing how to change it. 
 
Two key points, then, can be drawn from the interpretations I have been suggesting: first, that 
the central orientation of all of the teachings of early Buddhism is the need to understand how 
personal continuity operates (so that one can achieve liberation from that continuity) and that is 
not achieved by focusing on what one is or is not; and, second, that the starting place for such an 
enterprise is one’s own cognitive apparatus. And these two key points underpin my further 
suggestion that what is being taught in the early Buddhist texts is that the key factor in achieving 
liberation from the cycle of lives is understanding the nature of human experience.  
 
 
The First Noble Truth 
In fact this is indicated in the first Noble Truth, reportedly the very first teaching ever uttered by 
the Buddha himself, and arguably therefore worthy of more serious consideration than the 
doctrine of anatta. As is well-known, the first Noble Truth states the fact of dukkha. However one 
translates this problematic word, there are two factors that help one to come as close as possible 
to getting the proper meaning of it. The first is to remember that this is a truth statement and 
not a value judgement: that all things are unsatisfactory is in itself neither good nor bad but just 
factual. To say that something is dukkha is qualitatively no different from saying that it is raining: 
we may have good or bad reactions to such statements but they are something added to the 
statements themselves. And the second is to note that the textual description of what the truth 
of dukkha refers to is summarised as follows: “In short, it is the khandhas that are dukkha.”
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 The 
first Noble Truth, which identifies the very heart of the focus of the whole of the Buddhist 
religious teachings, itself states that to be the khandhas, the cognitive apparatus by which we 
experience. 
 
The significance of this becomes the more apparent if one adds to this the further point – and I 
myself believe this to be a fact, however conceptually or psychologically difficult it may be to 
accept it – that we do not have access to anything other than our experience. Though it appears 
to us that there is a whole world out there separate from us, which is constructed in such a way 
as to lend itself to most of the major religious traditions of the world seeking to understand the 
nature of the human self and the universe in which it finds itself, the fact is that we cannot get 
outside of our experience. Whatever knowledge we think we have is part of our experience. The 
way we see things is our experience. This is indicated in the description of the cognitive process I 
quoted earlier. The reference was to an occurrence of seeing giving rise to reflection and making 
manifold. And the significance of this lies in the metaphysics of dependent origination. If all 
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things are dependently originated, then the fact that we normally see them as independent and 
separate (as we do) is itself dependent on what happens in the process of cognition: it is that 
process that ‘makes manifold’, and sorts out all our incoming experiential data into the world as 
we are accustomed to it.
21
  
 
 
Dependent Origination 
Seen in this way the metaphysics of dependent origination throws illuminating light on the 
doctrine of anatta. In my view, this is the most coherent and appropriate interpretation of 
anatta, and relating it in more positive and substantial terms to the notion of whether or not 
there is a self is mistaken.
22
 Given the contemporary obsession with the subject of the self, and 
the frequency with which the Buddha was questioned about it, it has been all too easy to allow 
the doctrine both to dominate and to mislead; perhaps partly because the obsession continues to 
this day. But it is through a better understanding of what is meant by the khandhas, and of the 
centrality of what they really represent in the teachings of the Buddha, that one ceases to be 
sidetracked by questions about the self and begins to focus properly on what the teachings 
mean. 
 
In short, then, and to conclude very briefly, the Buddha’s teachings start with the only thing that 
we have access to – our own experiencing apparatus. And they remain centred on the entirety of 
our experience, how it works, how it continues, and how it might change. I am suggesting that 
what the Buddha taught is that one needs to understand experience qua experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 1. This is perhaps too great a generalisation, permissible only because of constraints of space, and 
there are some Indian religions for which experience plays a very different role. I am also 
confining myself to early Pali Buddhism, using the Pali Sutta Pitaka as my source material. All 
references herein to Pali texts are to Pali Text Society editions, and all translations are my own. 
 2. “Anatta: A Different Approach” in The Middle Way, Vol.70, 1. May 1995, pp.47-60; Identity and 
Experience, London: Luzac Oriental, 1996; and “The ‘External World’: Its Status and Relevance in 
the Pali Nikayas” in Religion, 29, 1999, pp.73-90. 
 3. My next book, Early Buddhism: A New Approach, published in London by Curzon Press, April 
2000. 
 4. A chapter is devoted to each of these in my book Identity and Experience. See also Mathieu 
Boisvert The Five Aggregates, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1995, for a different 
treatment; and Peter Harvey The Selfless Mind, London: Curzon Press, 1995, for an alternative 
discussion about vi––ana (consciousness). The Khandha Samyutta is the primary source in the 
Sutta Pitaka for references to the khandhas. 
  5. Nirvana is a Sanskrit word, but as it has become Anglicised I will not italicise it. 
 6. This is most clearly stated in Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, London: Gordon Fraser 
(repr.) 1985, and Richard Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares 
to Modern Colombo, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988. 
 7. Rahula (What the Buddha Taught, chapter VI) is the locus classicus for a description of this. 
 8. Chandogya Upanisad 6.8ff. cf. also Chandogya Upanisad 3.14 and Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 
2.4.6, 2.5, 4.4.13. Though the monism implicit in these references was not formally drawn out 
 8 
until the later Vedanta tradition, it is nevertheless clear from the way in which the Buddha’s 
teachings are given that it is to these key Upanisadic passages, as taught by the brahmins of the 
day, that he is referring. 
 9. Samyutta Nikaya (SN) I 135. 
10. See Majjhima Nikaya (MN) I 22f; Anguttara Nikaya (AN) IV 178f; Vinaya (V) III 4, for descriptions 
of the Buddha’s enlightenment. 
11. See, for example, Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, Cambridge: University Press, 1982, and Peter 
Harvey, The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism, London: 
Curzon Press, 1996, for two very different (both in style and in interpretation) studies in this vein. 
12. cf., for example, J. Pérez-Remón, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, The Hague: Mouton 
Publishers, 1980. 
13. The Sanskrit karman, Pali kamma, has become assimilated into the English language as karma, so 
it is not italicised. Literally, it means action. 
14. cf. in particular the Alagaddupama Sutta, MN I 130ff; and throughout the Khandha Samyutta. 
15. cf. Norman,  “A note on atta in the Alagaddupama-Sutta” in K.R. Norman, Collected Papers, Vol II. 
Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1991, p.202 on this point. 
16. In the Alagaddupama-Sutta (MN I 130ff) the word asati is found in connection with the self 
(p.136). This means ‘is not’, and can be used in the substantialist sense that something does not 
exist. But it might also mean, and in my view in this context does mean, that what is being 
referred to is not the case. And what is being referred to is that the khandhas and whatever 
comes within one’s sensory/mental experience are not one’s self. So, the text states, perceiving 
that this is not the case, one will not be concerned about it. My interpretation is compatible with 
the commentator’s view that asati means avijjamane, being untrue – arising from ignorance. 
And it also means that this sutta ties in with other similar references and is not the single context 
in which it is explicitly stated that there is no self. 
17. For example, MN I 232f: etam mama, eso ’ham asmi, eso me atta ti. This expression is also 
frequently found in the Khandha Samyutta, SN volume III. 
18. For example at MN I 8; SN II 27: “...aham nu kho smi, na nu kho smi; kim nu kho smi; katham nu 
kho smi; aham nu kho satto kuto agato so kuhimgami bhavissati ti.” 
19. This is a free translation, in order to draw out the meaning, of MN I 111f: “cakkhu– c’avuso 
paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi–nanam, tinnam sangati phasso, phassapaccaya vedana, yam 
vedeti tam sa–janati, yam sa–janati tam vitakketi, yam vitakketi tam papa–ceti.” The passage is 
fully discussed in Identity and Experience (op.cit.), perhaps especially in chapter III. 
20. cf. Vin I 9f. cf also: “Samkhittena pa–c’ upadanakkhandha dukkha:” e.g. SN V 421; MN I 48; AN I 
177; SN III 158: “Katama– ca bhikkhave dukkham? Pa–c’ upadanakkhandha ti ‘ssa vacaniyamÓ; 
and Dhammapada 202: “n’atthi khandhadisa dukkhaÓ. On the significance of upadana in 
association with khandha, cf. Identity and Experience, p.9, and R.M.L. Gethin, “The Five 
Khandhas: their treatment in the Nikayas and early Buddhism” in Journal of Indian Philosophy, 
14, 1986, pp.35-53. 
21. This is discussed further in my “The ‘External World’: Its Status and Relevance in the Pali 
Nikayas”. See also Lang, Karen, “Meditation as a Tool for Deconstructing the Phenomenal World” 
in T. Skorupski (ed.) The Buddhist Forum Vol III. London: SOAS, 1994. 
22. I find it very interesting in this respect that the great Buddhist philosopher and teacher 
Nagarjuna, who claimed only to be interpreting the Buddha’s earlier teaching, never uses the 
term anatta (anatman in Sanskrit). Rather, he focuses on dependent origination and uses the 
completely abstract term sunyata in this context. 
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